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Report No: ICR00324

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

IDA Grant Number D4120-GN

ON

A GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 29 MILLION
(US$ 40 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE
REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

FOR
RURAL MOBILITY AND CONNECTIVITY PROJECT
FEBRUARY 12, 2025

Transport
Western And Central Africa

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective November 20, 2024)

Currency Unit =	
SDR 0.77 =	**US$ 1**
US$ 1.3 =	**SDR 1**

FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31

Regional Vice President:	Ousmane Diagana
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AGUISER	*Agence Guinéenne de la Sécurité Routière* (Guinean Road Safety Agency)
AGEROUTE	*Agence de gestion des routes - National Road Agency*
AM	Aide-memoire
APD	Avant-Projet Detaille - Detailed Preliminary Project
APS	Avant-Projet Sommaire - Preliminary Project Summary
CBA	Cost-benefit analysis
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
CVEP	*Communautés Villageoises d'Entretien des Pistes* – (Community-based maintenance committee)
DNGR	*Direction Nationale du Génie Rural* – (National Rural Road Direction)
DNRPC	*Direction Nationale des routes Préfectorales et Communautaires* (National Préfectoral and Community Road Direction)
E&S	Environmental and Social
FER	Road Fund
GADP	Guinea Agribusiness Development Project
GIADP	Guinea Integrated Agricultural Development Project
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	Geographic information system
GNF	Guinean Franc
GOG	Government of Guinea
GRM	Grievance Redress Mechanism
IDA	International Development Association
IMF	International Monetary Fund – *Fond Monétaire International*
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
MCA	Multicriteria analysis
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MINTP	*Ministère des Travaux Publics* – (Ministry of Public Works)
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture – *Ministère de l'Agriculture*
PAD	*Project Appraisal Document*
PASA-G	*Projet d'appui au secteur agricole en Guinée* – (Guinea Agriculture Sector Support Project)
PAST	*Projet d'Appui au Secteur des Transports* – (Transport Sector Support Program *(*EU Transport Program))
PDO	Project Development Objective
PIU	Project Implementation Unit

PNDES	*Plan National de Développement Economique et Social* – (National Economic and Social Development Plan)
PNIR	*Programme National d'Infrastructures Rurales* – (National Rural Infrastructure Program)
PPSD	Project Procurement Strategy for Development
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
SCD	Systematic Country Diagnostic
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
TA	Technical Assistance
TTL	Task Team Leader
USD	United States Dollar

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DATA SHEET

BASIC DATA

Product Information

Operation ID	Operation Name
P164543	Rural Mobility and Connectivity Project
Product	**Operation Short Name**
Investment Project Financing (IPF)	Rural Mobility and Connectivity Project
Operation Status	**Approval Fiscal Year**
Closed	2019

Original EA Category

Partial Assessment (B) (Approval package - 10 Dec 2018)

CLIENTS

Borrower/Recipient	Implementing Agency
Republic of Guinea	Ministere de l'Agriculture

DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE

Original Development Objective (Approved as part of Approval Package on 10-Dec-2018)

The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to improve and sustain the rural population's road access to markets and basic services.

FINANCING

Financing Source	Original Amount (US$)	Revised Amount (US$)	Actual Disbursed (US$)
World Bank Financing	40,000,000.00	17,176,080.00	16,571,085.21
IDA-D4120	40,000,000.00	17,176,080.00	16,571,085.21

Total	40,000,000.00	17,176,080.00	16,571,085.21

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s)	Type	Amount Disbursed (US$M)	Key Revisions

KEY DATES

Key Events	Planned Date	Actual Date
Concept Review	01-Nov-2017	01-Nov-2017
Decision Review	10-Jul-2018	26-Jul-2018
Authorize Negotiations	15-Oct-2018	04-Nov-2018
Approval	10-Dec-2018	10-Dec-2018
Signing	30-Jan-2019	23-Jan-2019
Effectiveness	23-Jun-2019	21-Aug-2019
ICR/NCO	31-Jan-2025	12-Feb-2025
ICR Sequence.01 (Final)	--	12-Feb-2025
Operation Closing/Cancellation	28-Jun-2024	28-Jun-2024

RATINGS SUMMARY

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Modest

ISR RATINGS

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US$M)
01	12-Apr-2019	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00

02	17-Oct-2019	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.42
03	30-Mar-2020	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.72
04	09-Oct-2020	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	3.21
05	18-Nov-2020	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	3.26
06	19-May-2021	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	3.97
07	02-Dec-2021	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	4.39
08	27-May-2022	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	4.39
09	29-Dec-2022	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	6.16
10	14-Jun-2023	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	7.47
11	21-Dec-2023	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	12.08

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector	Sector	%	Adaptation Co-benefits (%)	Mitigation Co-benefits (%)
FY17 - Transportation	FY17 - Public Administration - Transportation	8	22	0
	FY17 - Rural and Inter-Urban Roads	92	22	0

Themes

Major Theme	Theme (Level 2)	Theme (Level 3)	%
FY17 - Environment and Natural Resource Management	FY17 - Climate change	FY17 - Adaptation	22
FY17 - Human Development and Gender	FY17 - Gender		15
FY17 - Private Sector Development	FY17 - Jobs	FY17 - Job Creation	84
	FY17 - Road Safety		12

FY17 - Urban and Rural Development	FY17 - Rural Development	FY17 - Rural Infrastructure and service delivery	89
		FY17 - Rural Markets	28

ADM STAFF

Role	At Approval	At ICR
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ICR Main Contributor(s)	Idrissa Sibailly, Akizou Bataba	

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Context

1. **At the time of appraisal, Guinea lagged many other Sub-Saharan African countries in development, despite its significant potential for economic growth.** The country was overly dependent on the mining sector contributing significantly to GDP, but highly vulnerable to price fluctuations and generating few jobs. Although GDP growth was projected at 6–8%, supported by IMF programs and other funding initiatives, economic diversification was critically needed to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth. The economy and social systems were still recovering from the post-Ebola crisis, which had exacerbated existing vulnerabilities. While the political situation was relatively stable, economic and social tensions persisted, occasionally leading to protests. These challenges underscored the urgency of implementing targeted initiatives to foster sustainable growth, reduce poverty, and build resilience.

2. **Poverty was predominantly concentrated in rural areas, where agriculture represented the main source of revenues, although the sector faced several critical challenges.** In rural areas, 65% of households were classified as poor, compared to 35.4% in urban areas. Farmers were disproportionately affected, accounting for 70% of the poor population. Agricultural productivity was low due to limited use of modern techniques, inadequate irrigation systems, and poor transport infrastructure. Despite its agricultural potential, Guinea relied on rice imports to meet its nutritional needs. Women played a key role in agriculture but faced numerous constraints, such as mobility issues, lower productivity, and limited access to labor resources. Therefore, addressing gender disparities, improving education, and investing in rural development were essential to unlocking the country's potential.

3. **Agriculture was identified by the Government of Guinea (GoG) as a key sector to promote and invest in, and several development programs aimed to support this agenda.** The National Development Plan (PNDES 2016-2020) identified actions to boost agricultural productivity. As the poor condition of roads undermined Guinea's competitiveness in agriculture and regional trade, several World Bank-funded projects highlighted the need to improve the rural roads network to support agriculture. These included the Guinea Agriculture Sector Support Project (PASA-G; P148114) under which a masterplan for rural roads development was prepared, the Guinea Integrated Agricultural Development Project (GIADP; P164326) and the Guinea Agribusiness Development Project (GADP; P164184).

4. **At the institutional level, Guinea's transport sector faced significant challenges, including a lack of capacity and overlapping responsibilities among ministries and government agencies.** This issue was particularly evident in the management of rural roads, where the Ministry of Public Works (MINTP) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) shared sometimes overlapping responsibilities due to the absence of a clear road classification system. The Directorate for rural works (DNGR) within the MOA oversaw most rural roads, while the Directorate for prefectural and community roads (DNRPC) within the MINTP oversaw the so-called ''prefectural roads" in rural communities. Both directorates had representatives in each of the eight regions and 33 prefectures of Guinea without sharing clear responsibilities and information. The sector also suffered from inadequate planning and insufficient financing capacity at the national level: (i) the second-generation Road Fund (FER) provided insufficient resources to meet the road network's maintenance needs; (ii) the Road Agency was not operational, further hampering sector management and implementation; (iii) rural communities and local governments lacked the financial capacity to effectively manage the rural and feeder road networks under their jurisdiction. All these constraints significantly hindered the development and maintenance of critical transport infrastructure, limiting connectivity and economic opportunities, especially in rural areas.

Theory of Change (Results Chain)

5. **The (implicit) Theory of Change in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) suggests that improving rural communities' road infrastructure and providing community facilities will unlock economic potential.** This fundamental role of road infrastructure as an enabler for other socio-economic activities has long been recognized as a rationale for investing in the development of rural roads to alleviate poverty in developing countries.

6. **The rural population's lack of road access to markets and basic services had been identified as a key hindrance to economic growth and social welfare in rural areas.** To address this problem, the project envisioned the rehabilitation of rural roads and the construction of small common facilities to enable the provision of services, such as water supply and warehouses, to the rural population. To ensure that these activities produce a long-lasting positive impact, the project also featured activities to support the routine maintenance of the rehabilitated roads and common facilities by the rural communities, and to improve road safety along these rural roads. The corresponding result chain can be illustrated as follows.




FIGURE 1: RESULT CHAIN AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE PAD

Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

7. **The PDO, as set out in the Financing Agreement (Grant D4120-GN) and the PAD, was to improve and sustain the rural population's road access to markets and basic services.** This can be unpacked into two objectives as outlined in the result chain. The first is to improve rural connectivity to provide rural populations with better access to markets and basic services. This "connectivity objective" was to be achieved mainly through rehabilitation of 800 km of rural roads and development of small community facilities such as storage warehouses and boreholes along these roads (Component 1). The second is to sustain the improvements achieved under the first component by supporting the establishment of community-based routine maintenance (Component 2).

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

8. **At appraisal, there were two clear expected outcomes whose achievement was to be measured through four key indicators (PDO-level indicators) as presented in the table 1:**

Table 1: PDO-Level Indicators

Expected Outcomes	PDO indicators
to improve the rural population's road access to markets and basic services	• number of people provided with an all-season road. • number of markets reached by an improved road • number of accessible schools and health centers
to sustain the rural population's road access to markets and basic services	• proportion of roads under communities' routine maintenance

Components

9. **The project consisted of three active components briefly described below** and a Contingent Emergency Response component (Component 4).

Table 2: Components overview

Components	Description	Sub-components	Amount in PAD (USD)
Component 1: Rural Road Rehabilitation Works (and community facilities)	This main component included technical studies and civil works aiming at rehabilitating about 800 km of rural roads and four bridges to obtain all-season road upgrades in six prefectures (Boké, Dubrka, Coyah, Pita, Labé and Dalaba)[1].	1.1: Preparatory and technical studies for rural road rehabilitation	2,500,000
		1.2: Rural road rehabilitation works	25,000,000
		1.3: Small community installations	2,500,000
Subtotal Component 1			30,000,000
Component 2: Institutional Capacity Strengthening for Road Maintenance and Safety	This component aimed at building the capacity of national and local authorities to tackle different issues, including community-based rural road maintenance and road safety.	2.1: Road asset management	2,000,000
		2.2: Rural road maintenance	3,000,000
		2.3: Road safety	1,600,000
Subtotal Component 2			6,600,000
Component 3: Project Management	This component aimed at ensuring an efficient project implementation by building the PIU's and implementing agencies' capacity, supporting strong citizen engagement and adequate M&E. It also included resettlement assistance to support the compensation cost for the PAPs, as requested by the Government.	3.1: UCP operating costs	2,000,000
		3.2: Monitoring and evaluation	600,000
		3.3: Compensation/Indemnities	400,000
		3.4: Citizen engagement and information communication	400,000
Subtotal Component 3			3,400,000
Component 4: (CERC)			0
TOTAL			40,000,000

[1] The latter were selected as priority intervention areas based notably on preliminary technical studies carried out under the PASA-G project. This component also included the building and/or rehabilitation of storage facilities for agricultural production and water wells in these selected areas.

The activities of Component 1 have been grouped under 4 different blocks as follows:

Table 3: Activities under Component 1

Denomination	Description	Status at completion
Priority block	43 km of rural roads and 16 community facilities (3 warehouses and 13 boreholes)	Works completed
Block A	313 km of rural roads and 63 community facilities (16 warehouses and 47 boreholes)	EIES completed. PAR validated and partially executed (70%) Works partially executed (40%)
Block B	320 km of rural roads and 58 community facilities (14 warehouses and 44 boreholes)	EIES and RAP finalized (not executed); Works not started
Block C	111 km of rural roads and 24 community facilities (5 warehouses and 19 boreholes)	EIES and RAP finalized (not executed); Works not started

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION

10. **The Project was restructured a few days before closing on June 28, 2024, but the PDO, outcomes and targets have not been revised.** The primary aim of the restructuring was to cancel uncommitted funds, reallocate the remaining funds between disbursement categories, and transfer the contracts for Block A works (representing 313 km of rural roads and 63 community facilities) to another World Bank-funded project under implementation (GADP-P164184). These contracts had an overall progress of 40% but could not be completed before the Project's closing date, representing a residual balance of approximately US$11.5 million. The restructuring consisted of (i) cancelling the Project's uncommitted funds (i.e., SDR 16.6 million, equivalent to US$21.9 million) that could not be disbursed because some procurement activities have been dropped; (ii) reallocating funds between disbursement categories; and (iii) revising scope and costs of Components 1 and 3 with the purpose of aligning existing plans and commitments with the allocated resources. The cancelled funds have been reallocated in the GoG's national IDA envelope to help cope with the country's difficult situation and remaining structural and connectivity challenges.

Revised Components

11. **The changes in the revised components essentially captured the revision of the amount allocated to the planned activities.** The funding allocated for outstanding civil works and other activities in Component 1 has been cancelled. In Component 2, all activities related to road maintenance have been removed, and their respective allocations have also been cancelled. The table below outlines the changes in component allocations following the cancellation of uncommitted funds.[2]

Table 4: Components re-allocations

Category	Initial allocations (US$)	Amount cancelled (US$)	Balance after cancellation (US$)	Final allocations (US$)
Component 1	**27,859,905**	**16,698,803**	**11,161,103**	**11,161,103**
Component 2	**6,328,800**	**4,631,891**	**1,696,910**	**1,145,777**
Component 3	**2,900,700**	**0**	**2,900,700**	**3,260,651**
Component 4(CERC)	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

[2] The difference between the dollar amounts allocated each component presented in this table and those presented elsewhere in the document stems from the change in conversion rate between SDR and USD.

Assistance for Resettlement	382,365	0	382,365	573,548
PPA Reimbursement	764,730	556,407	208,323	208,323
TOTAL	38,236,500[3]	21,887,100	16,349,400	16,349,400

Source: Project closing mission (Aide-memoire and Presentation, May 2024)

Revised PDO indicators

12. **No indicator has been revised.**

Other changes

13. **Several other changes occurred during implementation.** Notably, the list of rural roads to be rehabilitated by the Project changed several times and was finalized only in November 2020. Also, changes in human resources in both the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) and the Bank team can be noted: no less than 3 project coordinators and 6 TTLs oversaw the Project over its lifecycle. The following figure illustrates some important milestones of the Project's implementation.




FIGURE 2: PROJECT TIMELINE

[3] Initial amount stated in the PAD was 40 million USD, corresponding to SDR 29 million stated in the Financing Agreement D4120-GN. The difference might come from the SDR/USD exchange rate at the time of project closing.

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDO

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

14. **The Relevance of the PDO is rated as High.** The PDO remains relevant to the country's strategic development priorities and aligned with the World Bank's support strategy for Guinea.

15. **The PDO remains relevant to the country's strategic development priorities.** Developing reliable and sustainable road infrastructure is still a strategic priority of the National Development Plan for 2021-2025 (PNDES II). The PNDES II acknowledged the support role of roads for other productive sectors like agriculture. Making the network of department and community roads more practicable will facilitate the development of cotton, coffee, palm oil and food crops plantations.

16. **The PDO is still aligned with the current World Bank's support strategy for Guinea.** The project addresses challenges identified as strategic development priorities in the 2017 SCD (The World Bank, 2017) and the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for FY18-23. This focuses on accelerating transition to a more diversified, higher value-added economy while also addressing the multiple drivers of fragility. Rural poverty is a factor of fragility and improving rural roads contribute to tackle this issue by enhancing access to economic opportunities and basic services for the rural population.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

17. **The Efficacy is rated as Negligible.** The PDO was to improve and sustain the rural population's road access to markets and basic services. The extent to which this PDO was achieved was assessed by considering the Project's actual contribution to each of the two expected outcomes envisioned in the Result Chain.

18.

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

Outcome 1: The rural population's road access to markets and basic services is *improved.*

19. **This outcome was not achieved as planned, evidenced by the poor performance captured by the first three PDO level indicators.** The Project was expected to improve the population's road access to markets and basic services by rehabilitating about 800 km of rural roads in selected rural areas and building small community facilities along these roads (Component 1). This outcome was assessed by the following 3 PDO indicators: i) number of people provided with an all-season road; ii) number of markets reached by an improved road; and iii) number of accessible schools and health centers.

20. **Out of the expected 800 km of rural roads to be rehabilitated, only two work packages totaling 43km of priority roads were completed before the Project's closing date.** These 43 kilometers of rehabilitated roads include a 13-kilometer rural road linking Kinsi Bourou to Bimba in Dubréka prefecture, and a 30-kilometer road linking Niansogallé to Bowal Djabadji in Pita prefecture. This resulted in a limited impact, i.e. number of beneficiaries as shown in the table below. **Only 36,000 people gained access to an all-weather road rehabilitated by the Project, compared to the expected target of 315,000.**[4] Similarly, improvements in accessibility to basic services were limited. Only 3 markets (out of the targeted 65), 13 schools (out of the targeted 217), and 6 health centers (out of the targeted 108) were connected to a road improved by the Project (see table below).

21. **It should however be underscored that the Project has financed technical studies for the 800 km as well as the safeguards instruments and civils works to rehabilitate 313 km of rural roads (Block A).** These works were started before the Project's closing date and their physical execution rate stood at 40% at completion (See Table 3). The corresponding funds committed for these activities were disbursed under the Project. However, since none of these works has been completed before the Project's closing date, they are not accounted for in the Project's outcomes.

Table 5: Assessment of outcome 1

PDO Indicators	Baseline	Achieved	Final Target
People provided with an all-season road (Number)	0	35,981	314,824
Markets reached by an improved road (Number)	0	3	65
Number of schools and health centers accessible (Number)	0	13 schools	217
	0	6 health centers	108
Proportion of project roads under routine maintenance in communities (Percentage)	0	0	100

Outcome 2: The rural population's road access to markets and basic services is *sustained.*

22. **This outcome was not achieved at all.** This is evidenced by the PDO indicator related to the percentage of rehabilitated roads under communities' routine maintenance: at completion, none of the only 43 km of rural roads rehabilitated by the Project were covered by a community-based maintenance plan. (see Annex 7).

23. **The Project aimed at supporting a community-based maintenance system for the rural roads and community facilities rehabilitated or built under Component 1, by providing technical assistance and equipment (Sub-component 2.2), but these activities have been removed as it was not possible to implement them before project closing.** More specifically, the Project planned to re-establish the community-based maintenance committees

[4] The identified 36,000 direct beneficiaries are the local communities located in the intervention areas, i.e. the villages crossed by the constructed 43 km of rural roads.

(CVEPs) to maintain the rehabilitated roads under the jurisdiction of rural communities. The Project would have financed equipment and training for the CVEPs, but this opportunity did not materialize for the following reasons. Primarily, these maintenance activities were contingent upon having rehabilitated roads to be maintained. However, given the delays experienced throughout the Project's implementation, works were not expected to be completed within a timeframe that would have allowed a timely launching of maintenance activities[5]. Second, the institutional and financial arrangements to support these maintenance activities were not established[6]. (see Annex 7).

24. **The Project aimed to rehabilitate rural roads and small community facilities while also enhancing transport sector capacity through technical assistance and capacity-building activities for key stakeholders under Sub-components 2.1 (Road asset management) and 2.3 (Road Safety).** The results framework did not fully reflect the broader objective, only tracking (through binary intermediate indicator) the adoption of a decree to establish the Road Safety Observatory. Sub-component 2.1 for road asset management capacity-building faced delays, with AGEROUTE created by decree in July 2021 and only limited activities like technical assistance, training, and equipment procurement completed. As for road safety, the lack of reliable national road safety data was identified as a key issue. The Project addressed this challenge under Sub-component 2.3 by: (i) supporting the creation of a Road Safety Observatory, and (ii) implementing a pilot phase for road accident data collection using mobile-based iterative feedback mechanisms involving local administrators, service representatives, and road users. The Project also supported the operationalization of the Guinean Road Safety Agency (AGUISER) created by decree in April 2023, by financing equipment and activities such as technical assistance (for the collection and processing of road crash data, financing strategy, procedures manual) and training of key stakeholders.

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

25. **Considering the above assessments, the Overall Efficacy is rated as Negligible, as the Project's core activities were not implemented as planned and achieved only limited results.** At completion, less than 6% of the targeted kilometers of rural roads outlined during appraisal had been rehabilitated, resulting in minimal tangible positive impact on the intended beneficiaries. Note that even if Block A works (313 kilometers of roads and associated community facilities) had been completed before closing, the total achievement would have represented less than 40% of the initial target. Moreover, no sustainable mechanism for the community-based maintenance approach for the rural roads rehabilitated and the community facilities constructed by the Project was in place at completion. The Project failed to implement the activities related to the maintenance of rural roads by the local communities and will therefore not deliver the relevant expected outcomes. The lack of maintenance represents a serious risk to the development outcomes targeted by the Project. (See section D. Risks to Development Outcomes).

C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

26. **Efficiency is rated as Modest.** Overall, the limited results were achieved with significant delays.

27. **At the time of appraisal, no cost-benefit analysis (CBA) could be carried out as the detailed network of rural roads to be rehabilitated was not available, but a multicriteria analysis (MCA) governed the selection of the 800 kilometers targeted by the Project.** Although the specific list of roads was not finalized, the 800 kilometers were to be selected from the 1,100 kilometers identified in the rural road masterplan developed under PASA-G. This masterplan prioritized the rehabilitation of roads to maximize social and economic impact, ensuring the greatest benefits from investments in rural infrastructure. The MCA included factors related to the level of service (i.e., the

[5] In May 2024, the PIU submitted the terms of reference for recruiting a consultant to support the maintenance strategy for the 43 kilometers of priority roads rehabilitated. However, it was agreed not to proceed with this activity, as it could not be completed before the imminent project closing (see Aide-Memoire of the closing mission held in May 2024). Eventually, the activities under sub-component 2.2 were abandoned, and the total budget allocated to this sub-component was canceled during the Project restructuring.

[6] The PIU and National Agency for Local Government Financing (Agence Nationale de Financement des Collectivités Locales, ANAFIC) should have been involved in preparing the Local Development Plans and Annual Investment Plans, with a view to including the operating costs of the CVEP in these annual budgets, yet no partnership agreement between ANAFIC and the PIU was prepared or signed.

period during which the road is not passable), the road distance to the paved network, the socio-economic importance of the connectivity link, as well as population, agricultural productivity, investment cost and environmental criteria. (see Annex 2 in the PAD).

28. **It was not possible to provide a detailed ex-post economic analysis due to data unavailability, but a predominantly qualitative analysis of the efficiency of the Project's implementation can be based on available evidence.** First, note that the only 43 km of rural roads rehabilitated in Dubréka and Pita prefectures represented less than 6% of the expected project's footprint of 800 km, which is not sufficient to qualify as a representative sample of the Project's roads on which to perform an ex-post evaluation. However, output-to-cost ratios can be calculated based on these limited works achieved. The two contracts awarded for the two road work packages amounted to a total cost of USD 903,000 (compared to an estimated USD 1,084,350 in the procurement plan). Considering the 43 km, this represents an average unit cost of about USD 21,000 per kilometer, which is in the low range for the sector. In comparison, the cost estimates for the different work packages for the 313 kilometers (Block A) ranged from USD 12,000 to USD 46,000 per kilometer and the average cost envisioned at appraisal was USD 31,250 per kilometer. In this regard, the few road works completed before project closing were delivered in a cost-efficient manner. Likewise, the limited amount allocated to the capacity-building activities related to road safety (US$1.6 million in sub-component 2.3) and road asset management (US$2 million in sub-component 2.1) yield tangible and significant results by supporting the creation and operationalization of AGUISER and AGEROUTE. (See Annex 4 – Cost per Unit Details).

29. **The few works completed were significantly delayed due to a combination of exogenous factors (such as COVID-19 and political instability) and the limited capacity for critical activities, including studies and supervision, civil works, and project management.** The rehabilitation of the 43 km of priority roads was completed more than two years behind schedule. While one year of this delay could be attributed to force majeure, most of the delay resulted from shortcomings of key stakeholders, including insufficient technical capacity for civil works (from technical studies to civil works and works supervision) and slow decision-making at institutional level, further aggravated by lengthy review processes, procurement issues and weak contract management at the project level. For example, a perusal of the aide-memoires of the first six implementation support missions suggests that the PIU's challenges in contract management hindered the prompt resolution of issues affecting the execution of works.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

30. **The overall outcome of the Project is assessed as Unsatisfactory.** The PDO remained highly relevant throughout implementation. The extent of achievement of the PDO (efficacy) was considered Negligible, given the poor performance in the achievement of all PDO indicator targets and Efficiency was rated as Modest.

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS

Gender

31. **The Project did not significantly improve women's access to economic opportunities in the selected rural areas.** Component 1 intended to contribute to reduce women barriers to economic opportunities by providing them with a road access to markets and basic services but did not achieve significant results in this regard. The limited results achieved in the rehabilitation of rural roads translated into a limited impact of gender accessibility.

32. **The Project did not significantly contribute to closing the gender gaps regarding access to formal economic opportunities.** The Project aimed at promoting women's participation in road rehabilitation and maintenance through gender sensitization of the contractors, under sub-component 1.2. The promotion of women participation in road maintenance by the CVEPs to be supported by the project was also envisioned but the relevant activities were eventually removed during the Project's restructuring.

Institutional Strengthening

33. **Institutional strengthening is one of the few notable achievements of the Project**. Through the technical assistance and other capacity-building activities supported under Component 2, the Project contributed to the operationalization of the national road agency (AGEROUTE) and the Guinean Road Safety Agency (AGUISER) respectively created by decree in July 2021 and April 2023.[7] While all the activities envisioned at appraisal under Component 2 have not been implemented, those completed (e.g., TA, procedures manual, training of key stakeholders, purchase of equipment, etc.) represent a first step toward an improved transport sector.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

34. **The Project's design was based on simple logic, with clear objectives and a good understanding of the difficult institutional context.** The PDO was well-aligned with Guinea's National Socio-Economic Development Plan (PNDES), which prioritized the development of reliable and resilient infrastructure to enhance agricultural productivity and reduce rural poverty. This alignment was reflected in the activities proposed under the Project's Components 1 and 2. The Project's design also addressed the complex institutional context, where overlapping responsibilities for rural road construction were divided between the Directorate for Prefectural and Community Roads (DNRPC) under the Ministry of Public Works (MINTP) and the Directorate for Rural Works (DNGR) within the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). To overcome this challenge, the Project aimed at facilitating and regulating the collaboration between the two institutions through the Financing Agreement D4120-GN (Schedule 2, Section I.B. Interinstitutional Agreement), ensuring a more coordinated approach to implementation. The Project was designed to have the MOA as the relevant partner for project implementation and to host a new PIU, without any track record of implemented projects and staffed with newly hired specialists. The PIU relied on the DNGR staff's technical skills, due to their experience on the PASA-G Project.

35. **The Project's design sought to capitalize on the World Bank's extensive experience in Guinea's transport sector.** Key lessons learned from the PNIR I (P057996) and PNIR II (P065127) projects were incorporated, including: (i) the importance of narrowing the geographic focus of interventions to achieve greater impact, and (ii) the need to integrate maintenance to ensure sustainability. The Project prioritized the rehabilitation of 800 km of rural roads across six prefectures—Boké, Dubreka, Coyah, Pita, Labé, and Dalaba—as its key intervention area. To promote sustainability, the Project initially included activities to reactivate a community-based maintenance system (CVEPs) for maintaining the rehabilitated roads. However, these activities were not implemented due to shortcomings in the Project's design, which lacked sufficient provisions to ensure their effective execution.

36. **Time constraints during the project preparation phase led to a suboptimal quality of technical studies, which negatively impacted the Project's implementation.** The Project's design was based on preliminary studies conducted under the Guinea Agriculture Sector Support Project (PASA-G, P148114). Due to time constraints, the team strategically opted to directly hire the same consultants who had worked on the PASA-G studies to carry out the detailed technical studies. This decision aimed to reduce costs and expedite the procurement process. However, this choice proved problematic, as the suboptimal quality of the detailed studies led to increased costs and delays during the project implementation phase.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

Factors outside the control of government and/or implementing entities.

[7] Note that the functions of the Road Safety Observatory foreseen during the Project's preparation are now carried out by the Directorate of Studies, Planning and Statistics of AGUISER.

37. **The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 had a significant impact on the Project kick off, leading to delays in implementing planned activities.** Travel restrictions and health protocols disrupted the preparatory activities (finalization of technical studies and safeguards instruments) and reduced workforce availability, slowing down construction work schedules (see AM of the virtual implementation support missions held in September 2020 and March 2021). During this period, the Bank and the PIU teams concentrated their efforts to pursue other Project's activities that could be advanced despite the constraints of the COVID-19 pandemic.

38. **The political change triggered Bank policy OP 7.30 and resulted in the suspension of disbursements and the halt of activities.** Following the coup on September 5, 2021, the World Bank activated its Operational Policy OP 7.30. The rehabilitation work on 43 km of priority roads, initially scheduled to resume on September 15, 2021, could only restart after the suspension was lifted in March 2022. This prolonged delay complicated the resumption of work, as companies had demobilized during the suspension period.

Factors subject to the control of government and/or implementing entities.

39. **Changes in the scope of work have delayed the start of related activities.** The Project's primary activities focused on rehabilitating 800 km of rural roads across six prefectures, building on preliminary design studies conducted under PASA-G. The selection of roads for rehabilitation was made by the GoG, based on the rural masterplan developed under PASA-G and aligned with the GIAPD to maximize the impact of both agricultural projects. The list of roads to be rehabilitated was discussed during the project identification stage and was expected to be finalized at appraisal. However, the first confirmed list was not available until September 2020 (see Aide - memoire of the virtual implementation support mission, September 18-25, 2020, paragraph 7). This delay impacted the completion of necessary technical studies and safeguard instruments, leading to a postponement in the start of road works. Further delays occurred due to repeated revisions of the scope of work. On November 11, 2020, the Government provided a revised list of rural roads for rehabilitation after three rounds of reviews. These changes were necessitated by the fact that approximately 159km of the originally selected 800km had already undergone emergency rehabilitation through other funding sources. Consequently, technical, environmental, and social studies had to be conducted for the newly identified sections, causing additional delays in project implementation.

40. **The Project's implementation suffered from the low capacity in project and contract management at the PIU level, further aggravated by government decisions that affected the PIU team.** Coordination and procurement proved unsatisfactory during the finalization of studies and start of works resulting in low progress of activities and significant delay in procurement procedures, as reflected in the Aide-memoire of March 2021 and in the ISR of May 2021, where Project Management has been downgraded from Satisfactory to Moderately Satisfactory. Besides, there were several disruptions in PIU staffing. Five members of the PIU, including the Coordinator, the M&E specialist, two local experts and the GIS specialist, who were all retired civil servants, have been affected by a government decision requiring the termination of their contracts.

Factors subject to the control of the World Bank

41. **The project experienced a high turnover of Task Team Leaders (TTLs) which undermined the quality of Bank supervision.** The frequent changes in TTLs resulted in a lack of consistent interlocutors at the World Bank. Six TTLs have been in command over the project cycle, which significantly affected collaboration with the PIU and other implementing entities, particularly during TTL transition periods. This frequent turnover did not facilitate the identification of early signs of underperformance by the PIU team and the adoption of effective corrective actions to enhance the Project's overall performance.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design

42. **The M&E design was based on a straightforward logic aligned with the Project's results chain. The outcome and intermediate indicators were relatively simple to monitor and evaluate.** The four PDO indicators were clear and somehow effective in capturing the desired outcomes of the Project. The first three indicators focused on measuring improved accessibility for rural populations facilitated by the project. The fourth indicator aimed at measuring the effectiveness of routine maintenance delivered through the mechanism established by the Project. The intermediate results indicators were appropriately designed to track progress toward achieving the desired outputs critical to the Project's success.

43. **Although sufficient for tracking the progress of project implementation, the M&E design was relatively focused on outputs rather than outcomes**. For instance, measuring the number of schools within a 2-kilometer distance from a road improved by the project does not necessarily capture the potential impact on school attendance. This could have been better reflected through an indicator measuring the number of students with improved access to schools. Similarly, the percentage of roads under routine maintenance does not adequately reflect the quality of the maintenance, which could have been better assessed through an indicator measuring user satisfaction with the maintenance.

M&E Implementation

44. **The M&E implementation was disturbed by external factors such the Covid-19 outbreak in 2020, the suspension of Bank operations following the military coup on September 5, 2021, in compliance with the Bank's operational policy OP 7.30 and other administrative reasons.** The travel restrictions following the Covid-19 pandemic prevented site visits and closed monitoring of some indicators. However, the slow progress of the activities was adequately captured by the M&E and documented in the successive ISRs. Several activities were not carried out and the related indicators could therefore not be monitored and evaluated. The contracts of the specialists in M&E, GIS, social safeguards, environmental safeguards, and the internal auditor expired during the suspension of operations (OP 7.30). The position of the M&E specialist remained vacant for several months as no suitable candidate could be found to replace the specialist affected by the governmental retirement mandate, who eventually resumed working for the PCU.

M&E Utilization

45. **The M&E results have consistently informed the Bank supervision as reflected in the ISRs. However, a more pragmatic M&E utilization could have helped the Bank team to act more proactively to improve project implementation.** Based on the evidence of the little progress in the Project implementation, the Bank team formulated several recommendations to improve the Project implementation and progress towards the achievement of the PDO. However, these recommendations were not followed in effect and the same warning was repeated ISR after ISR. The IP rating has consistently remained on the MU/U level since December 2021. A more proactive approach would certainly have led the team to consider a project restructuring after the mid-term review to revise the Project's scope based on achievable outcomes and to allow to focus efforts on the related activities.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

46. **The overall rating of the Quality of M&E is Modest.** Overall, there were only minor shortcomings in the M&E system's design and implementation, but the lack of proactivity to restructuring represented a significant shortcoming in M&E utilization.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

Environmental and Social Safeguards

47. **The Project was classified as Category B due to the potential social and environmental risks and negative impacts associated with the civil works for the rehabilitation of approximately 800 km of rural roads, as well as the construction of small community facilities for agricultural production (storage), drilling, and other physical facilities under Component 1.** Five safeguard policies were triggered: OP/BP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP/BP 4.04 (Natural Habitats), OP/BP 4.36 (Forests), OP/BP 4.11 (Physical Cultural Resources), and OP/BP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement).

48. **The overall performance in terms of environmental safeguards during the Project's implementation is rated Moderately Satisfactory.** The field visit to the 43 km priority sections and the completed community infrastructures (water boreholes and warehouses) demonstrated good environmental management of the sites (construction areas and borrow pits), in compliance with the Bank's requirements. However, shortcomings in the PIU's management of E&S aspects were also noted elsewhere, notably regarding the works of Block A.

49. **The Project's overall social safeguards performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.** The PIU has been established, equipped, and made operational to effectively carry out its tasks. However, the RAP implementation still requires improvement to fully meet the Bank's standards. During the project preparation phase, the Government of Guinea (GoG) developed a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for known activities covering 52.4 km of priority roads, as well as a Resettlement Policy Framework to guide the preparation of RAPs for segments that were not yet identified. During implementation, three additional RAPs were developed for Block A (313 km), Block B (320 km), and Block C (111 km). However, only the RAP for Block A was reviewed and approved by the Bank. The RAPs for Block B and Block C were transferred to the Bank-funded GADP project for further review and implementation. At project completion, only the two RAPs for the 43 km priority section[8] and for the 313 km of Block A were satisfactorily implemented with funding from IDA as confirmed by the RAP implementation audit report[9].

Fiduciary (Financial Management and Procurement)

50. **At the project appraisal stage, the overall fiduciary risk was rated Substantial, and mitigation measures were proposed to strengthen internal control and maintain a seamless information transmission by the PIU**. The Project Procurement Strategy for Development (PPSD) allowed to appropriately identify the risks, strengths and weaknesses of the parties involved in the project's procurement activities. The project aimed at financing procurement of civil works, equipment, IT equipment, vehicles, consultants, and non-consulting services.

51. **The overall Financial Management performance was rated as Satisfactory throughout project implementation.** Annual Audited Financial Statements and Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) have been submitted to the Bank in a timely manner, with no major issues identified. Consistently, ISR ratings have been deemed "Satisfactory" over the years of the Project's implementation. However, some shortcomings have been noted, such as the delayed validation of the Annual Work Plan and Budget (AWPB) by the steering committee.

52. **The overall Procurement performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory, considering the performance throughout project implementation.** This is explained by (1) the lack of anticipation in procurement processes (extensive delays in procurement, especially in evaluations); (2) the suspension of disbursements from the World Bank for 6 months (transitional measures of Operational Policy OP 7.30). This prevented the Project from continuing ongoing procurement procedures; (3) the difficulties in mobilizing members of the procurement committees (lack of

[8] 12 Project-Affected Persons (PAPs) were identified across the prefectures of Pita (Rural Commune of Sangareah) and Dubréka (Rural Commune of Tanènè) for a total cost of compensation was 144,209,500 GNF.

[9] The report confirmed the Project's compliance in several areas, including: (i) safeguard instruments preparation and disclosure; (ii) staffing arrangement and mobilization; (iii) coordination with other competent agencies in validating and implementing safeguard policies; (iv) establishment and maintenance of a functional Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM). The PIU has also demonstrated efforts to resolve a sexual harassment complaint through: (i) recruitment of a GBV specialist; (ii) updating GRM procedures; (iii) integration of SEA/SH measures in all instruments; (iv) Signing of the Code of Conduct (CoC) by all workers; (v) SEA/SH action plan implementation (including training).

motivation); (4) the weak management and monitoring capacities of contracts/procurements (43 km as an illustrative example).

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

53. **The Project's design built on a solid Bank experience in the transport and agriculture sectors in Guinea, but underestimated capacity and institutional challenges.** The Project was designed to fill important gaps identified in the transport sector and complement other development projects to support the agriculture sector. The Project's core activities required the cooperation between different governmental entities under two sector ministries and necessitated a strong coordination effort from the various stakeholders involved in the management of rural roads. The coordination issues were identified during the project identification stage and the institutional arrangements proposed in the Project's design aimed at addressing them. However, the coordination challenges, exacerbated by the low institutional capacity seem to have been underestimated at appraisal and the proposed arrangement proved insufficient to achieve the expected outcomes during project implementation.

54. **Another shortcoming in the Project's design is related to the rural road maintenance.** While the utmost importance of pairing the rehabilitation with a community-based maintenance mechanism was acknowledged during the project preparation stage, the Project's design did not take all necessary measures to ensure effective maintenance beyond the Project's horizon. For example, the institutional arrangements needed to implement the CEVP approach were not in place and no provisions were secured for the financing of the maintenance activities after project closing and ensure sustainability of the Project's outcomes (non-participation of ANAFIC, CVEPs' operating costs not included in the Local Development Plans, etc.).

Quality of Supervision

55. **The Bank team performed all required implementation support missions in a timely manner, despite the challenging context.** The travel restrictions imposed due to the COVID-19 outbreak or political circumstances did not hinder the Bank from supervising the Project's implementation. While in-person support missions could not be performed between March 2020 and March 2022, several virtual missions were conducted to monitor the progress of the limited activities that could be initiated or executed during the challenging first two years of implementation. Over time, the Bank team consistently provided recommendations to enhance project execution, as documented in the aide-memoires and ISRs following the eleven support missions conducted throughout the project period.

56. **However, the quality of supervision was affected by several factors.** While virtual missions were conducted in place of field missions, they did not foster the development of strong connections with the PIU or create the trustful environment necessary for effective collaboration. Additionally, the Bank team experienced a frequent turnover of remotely based TTLs. Interviews conducted for this report suggest that the handover process between TTLs was not always as seamless or effective as it could have been. Critical TTL transitions adversely affected the quality of the Mid-Term Review conducted in February 2023. Despite clear evidence that the PDO was unattainable, no restructuring measures were proposed in time following the review. The absence of TTLs based in Guinea further hindered the Bank's ability to provide the level of implementation support needed in such a challenging context. The interviews also highlighted communication challenges between the Bank team and the PIU. For instance, the PIU reported delays in responses, with several emails and calls remaining unanswered for weeks. Furthermore, despite consistently concerning M&E results over the years, the Bank team did not demonstrate sufficient proactivity in addressing the persistent challenges in project implementation. A restructuring occurred only at the end of the Project's implementation.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

57. **Considering the significant shortcomings in both the quality of project preparation and supervision, the Bank's overall performance is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory.** The Bank team failed to anticipate several foreseeable implementation challenges during the project preparation phase. The deficiencies in supervision, further aggravated by external factors (Covid-19, political changes), hindered the Bank's ability to effectively address these challenges during project implementation, despite sustained effort to support implementation and several key actions in the last months of the project.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

58. **The Project's modest achievements in terms of rural roads rehabilitated and community facilities constructed are at risk of potential deterioration due to lack of maintenance.** To overcome the institutional challenges affecting the rural roads network condition, the Project planned to secure routine maintenance of the rural roads rehabilitated and community facilities constructed under Component 1. However, the relevant activities in Component 2 have been cancelled. The community-based maintenance strategies have not been developed, and the institutional and financial arrangements are not in place. The rehabilitation works of the 13 km section visited in October 2024 were completed in February 2023 and already exhibited signs of deterioration. The lack of maintenance is aggravated by the presence of quarries nearby and the repeated passages of heavy trucks.

59. **The lack of long-term commitment from the GoG to effectively support the operations of the Road Agency (AGEROUTE) and the road safety agency (AGUISER) is a risk for the transport sector.** The positive results achieved with the creation and the operationalization of AGEROUTE and AGUISER represent only a first step toward building institutional capacity to improve road asset management and road safety in the country. However, these results risk not to bear long-lasting fruits due to the absence of long-term strategies to support the development and operations of these agencies. The delineation of responsibilities between AGEROUTE and the various ministerial directorates in charge of the road network still needs to be clarified to avoid overlapping mandate and the resulting inefficiencies.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

60. **The project design should reflect the context's challenges, including fragility, governance, and capacity issues.** The PAD emphasized the importance of geographic focus to maximize impact based on the lessons learned from past experiences. However, the Project aimed to rehabilitate 800 km of rural roads across six prefectures. The initial target of 350 km—including 43 km of priority tracks and 313 km of Block A—required at least 20 work packages to be tendered, alongside numerous contracts to be managed and monitored by the PIU across the four distant prefectures (Dubréka, Pita, Boké and Coyah). Given the challenging context, characterized by low capacity at multiple levels (institutional, construction firms, engineering and supervision consultants, procurement, etc.), the target of 800 km might have been overly ambitious. A phased approach could have improved outcomes, focusing initially on rehabilitating 350 km while simultaneously building institutional and technical capacity. This would have allowed the Project to progress more effectively to a second phase, addressing the remaining roads with greater confidence and readiness.

61. **Designing adequate provisions to ensure the sustainability of the PDOs is critical**. The importance of integrating a community-based maintenance mechanism for the rehabilitated roads was acknowledged during the project preparation stage. However, the Project's design failed to include all the necessary measures to ensure its effective implementation. For example, the institutional and financial arrangements required to operationalize the community-based road maintenance committees (CVEPs) and ensure their sustainability after the Project were not established. Embedding conditions tied to the establishment of adequate institutional and financial arrangements or

the requirement of counterpart funding to finance maintenance operations at the appraisal stage, could have helped secure the effectiveness of the community-based maintenance mechanism promoted by the Project.

62. **When low capacity meets governance challenges, stronger supervision is warranted to achieve results.** Over the four years of implementation, the Project suffered from a high turnover of Bank team and PIU staffs (with six successive remote-based TTLs and three PIU coordinators) and from a too loose supervision and lack of proactivity, given the challenging institutional context and the low technical capacity at multiple levels (PIU, construction firms, engineering, and supervision consultants, etc.). The combined efforts and closer collaboration of the Bank team and the PIU during the last few months of project implementation helped improve the implementation of several activities and the late restructuring enabled the GoG to capitalize on the Project's partial achievements by transferring the contracts of the ongoing works to the GDAP (P164184).

63. **The time and resources saved on technical studies during preparation may be outweighed by cost inefficiencies and delays during project implementation.** The Project's implementation challenges stemming from the suboptimal quality of the detailed technical studies conducted by the PASA-G consultants[10] (cf. point 34) highlighted the critical importance of maintaining high-quality preparation, even when aiming to accelerate execution. Sacrificing preparation quality can undermine the efficiency and effectiveness of implementation. Given the constraints on reduced project preparation time, a valuable lesson for future operations is to adopt a pipeline strategy. This approach would involve using one project's funds to finance detailed technical studies and not only feasibility studies for the next project, thereby streamlining preparation time and enhancing readiness for subsequent operations.

[10] Due to time constraints, the team strategically opted to directly hire the same consultants who had worked on the PASA-G studies to carry out the detailed technical studies. This decision aimed to reduce costs and expedite the procurement process. However, this choice ultimately proved problematic, as the suboptimal quality of the detailed studies led to increased costs and delays during the project implementation phase.

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS FRAMEWORK

PDO Indicators by Outcomes

Improve and sustain rural population accessibility to markets and basic services								
Indicator Name	Baseline		Closing Period (Original)		Closing Period (Current)		Actual Achieved at Completion	
	Result	Month/Year	Result	Month/Year	Result	Month/Year	Result	Month/Year
People provided with an all season road (Number)	0.00	Oct/2018	314,824.00	Jun/2024	314,824.00	Jun/2024	35,981	Jun/2024
Number of markets reached by an improved road (Number)	0.00	Oct/2018	65.00	Jun/2024	65.00	Jun/2024	3	Jun/2024
Number of accessible schools and health centers (Number)	0.00	Oct/2018	325.00	Jun/2024	325.00	Jun/2024	19.00	Jun/2024
	Comments on achieving targets		13 schools and 6 health centers are serviced by the roads under rehabilitation.					
Proportion of project roads under communities routine maintenance (Percentage)	0.00	Oct/2018	100.00	Jun/2024	100.00	Jun/2024	0.00	Jun/2024

Intermediate Indicators by Components

Rural roads and small community facilities rehabilitation								
Indicator Name	Baseline		Closing Period (Original)		Closing Period (Current)		Actual Achieved at Completion	
	Result	Month/Year	Result	Month/Year	Result	Month/Year	Result	Month/Year
Roads rehabilitated - rural (Kilometers)	0.00		800.00		800.00		43.00	

Roads rehabilitated - non-rural (Kilometers)	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	
People benefiting from improved access to sustainable transport infrastructure and services (Number of people) CRI					35,981	Jun/2024	35,981	Jun/2024
People benefiting from improved access to sustainable transport infrastructure and services – Female (Number of people) CRI					18,350	Jun/2024	18,350	Jun/2024
	Comments on achieving targets		51% of females					
People benefiting from improved access to sustainable transport infrastructure and services – Youth (Number of people) CRI					19,430	Jun/2024	19,430	Jun/2024
	Comments on achieving targets		54% of youth					
Capacity building for road maintenance and safety								
Indicator Name	Baseline		Closing Period (Original)		Closing Period (Current)		Actual Achieved at Completion	
	Result	Month/Year	Result	Month/Year	Result	Month/Year	Result	Month/Year
Number of person-days worked for routine maintenance (Number)	0.00	Oct/2018	84,000.00	Jun/2024	84,000.00	Jun/2024	0.00	Jun/2024
	Comments on achieving targets		Maintenance activity has not started.					
Share of women employed in routine maintenance (Percentage)	0.00	Oct/2018	35.00	Jun/2024	35.00	Jun/2024	0.00	Jun/2024
	Comments on achieving targets		Maintenance activity has not strated					
Number of women represented in decision commitee of each community maintenance group (Number)	0.00	Oct/2018	3.00	Jun/2024	3.00	Jun/2024	0.00	Jun/2024
	Comments on achieving targets		Maintenance groups have not been formed yet.					
	No	Oct/2018	Yes	Jun/2024	Yes	Jun/2024	Yes	Jun/2024

Decree of creation of the Road Safety Observatory (Yes/No)	Comments on achieving targets		The functions of the Road Safety Observatory foreseen during the preparation of the project are now carried out by AGUISER, within its Directorate of Studies, Planning and Statistics.					
Project management								
Indicator Name	Baseline		Closing Period (Original)		Closing Period (Current)		Actual Achieved at Completion	
	Result	Month/Year	Result	Month/Year	Result	Month/Year	Result	Month/Year
Grievances addressed within the stipulated timeframe (Percentage)	0.00	Oct/2018	100.00	Jun/2024	100.00	Jun/2024	100.00	Jun/2024
	Comments on achieving targets		See assessment of the GRM for detailed analysis					
Percentage of villages covered by information and awareness sessions on violence against women (Percentage)	0.00	Oct/2018	100.00	Jun/2024	100.00	Jun/2024	100.00	Jun/2024
GBV risk monitoring (Yes/No)	No	Oct/2018	Yes	Jun/2024	Yes	Jun/2024	Yes	Jun/2024

B. KEY OUTPUTS

Improve and sustain rural population accessibility to markets and basic services	
PDO Indicators	1. People provided with an all-season road 2. Number of markets reached by an improved road 3. Number of accessible schools and health centers 4. Proportion of project roads under communities' routine maintenance
Key Outputs **(linked to the achievement of the PDO Outcome)**	1. 35,981 people provided and an all-season road in Dubréka and Pita prefectures 2. 3 markets reached by the 43 km of improved roads 3. 13 schools and 6 health centers are serviced by the rehabilitated roads 4. 0% (the related activities have been cancelled)

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name	Role
Oceane Keou	Team Leader
Theophile Bougna Lonla	Team Leader
Fatoumata Toure	Financial Management Specialist
Koulako Camara	Procurement Specialist
Mamady Kobele Keita	Environmental Specialist
Nghi Quy Nguyen	Social Specialist
Kristyna Bishop	Social Specialist
Thierno Hamidou Diallo	Procurement Team
Papa Mamadou Fall	Team Member
Racky Dia Camara	Team Member
Ndiaga Samb	Team Member
Tahirou Kalam	Team Member
Murielle Laurette Irina Edon Babatounde	Team Member
Cedric Cubahiro	Team Member
Windpouire Josephine Lydie Sankara	Team Member
Julie Babinard	Team Member
Kelly Ann Gillin Zongo	Team Member
Papa Modou Ndiaye	Team Member

B. STAFF TIME & COST

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time & Cost	
	No. of Staff Weeks	US$ (including travel and consultant costs)
Preparation		
FY18	41.256	255,522.59
FY19	45.610	318,141.91
FY20	2.645	20,364.85
FY21	3.029	29,468.29
FY22	0.200	4,228.08
FY23	0.400	3,515.84
Total	93.14	631,241.56
Supervision/ICR		
FY18	0.000	.00
FY19	0.000	3,274.50
FY20	24.442	187,755.38
FY21	29.127	164,916.31
FY22	18.099	91,933.81
FY23	29.832	172,202.88
FY24	33.195	249,793.37
FY25	14.377	80,333.80
Total	149.07	950,210.05

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COSTS BY COMPONENT

Table 5: Costs by component

Components	Amount at Approval	Actual at Project Closing	Percentage of Approval
Rural Road Rehabilitation Works (and community facilities)	$27,859,905	$11,161,103	40.06%
Institutional Capacity Strengthening for Road Maintenance and Safety	$6,328,800	$1,145,777	18.10%
Project Management	$2,900,700	$3,260,651	112.41%
Resettlement Assistance	$382,365	$573,548	150.00%
Reimbursement of the Preparation Advance	$764,730	$208,323	27.24%
TOTAL	**$38,236,500**	**$16,349,400**	**42.76%**
Source of funds: IDA Grant - D4120 (100 percent)			

ANNEX 4. TIMELINE OF THE PROJECT'S IMPLEMENTATION RELATED TO PUBLIC WORKS AND COSTS PER UNIT DETAILS

Table 6: Project implementation timeline

Lots	Technical Studies Validation (APS/APD)	EIES Validation	PAR Submission to the Bank	PAR Validation by the Bank	PAR Publication	Start of Contractor Hiring Process	Start of Supervision Consultants Hiring Process	Notice to Proceed for Contractors	Notice to Proceed for Supervision Consultants	Effective Start Date of Works	Provisional acceptance of Works	Final acceptance of Works
Priority tracks (43 km)	11/03/2020	2018	06/03/20	16/04/20	26/05/20	09/03/20	24/02/20	14/12/20	02/02/20	28/12/20 Lot 1 and 23/12/20 Lot 2	02/06/23 Lot 1 and 08/02/23	27/05/24 and 03/06/24
Block A	11/11/2023	22/08/23	28/11/22	05/07/23	27/11/23	13/02/23	21/09/22	10/08/23	21/09/23	04/01/24	None	None
Block B	13/02/2023	08/07/24	15/09/23	02/07/24	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Block C	18/04/2024	05/07/24	23/11/23	02/07/24	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None

Table 7: Cost per unit details for the Priority roads

Priority roads *(Dubreka & Pita)*	**Package (KM)**	**Contract costs**	**Cost per unit**
	43.00	$903,000.00	***$21,000.00***

Table 8: Cost per unit details for the Block A

Block A (Boke et Coya)	Work packages (KM)	Costs (USD)	Cost per unit
Coya	23.00	1,044,698.35	*$45,421.67*
	12.35	148,030.64	*$11,986.29*
	20.00	950,355.38	*$47,517.77*
	11.40	408,798.97	*$35,859.56*
	8.00	204,048.23	*$25,506.03*
	20.35	930,848.31	*$45,741.93*
	7.50	339,242.99	*$45,232.40*
Boke	23.76	409,223.35	*$17,223.20*
	8.00	235,213.73	*$29,401.72*
	34.19	1,342,239.30	*$39,262.84*
	40.84	1,596,135.02	*$39,080.73*
	30.35	1,378,652.07	*$45,422.12*
	16.75	508,630.98	*$30,362.40*
	4.20	97,201.67	*$23,143.26*
	12.70	410,720.94	*$32,340.23*
	17.39	696,293.82	*$40,039.90*
	2.60	97,797.08	*$37,614.26*
	3.24	143,205.37	*$44,199.19*
	10.30	358,327.46	*$34,789.07*
	6.30	186,256.05	*$29,564.45*
TOTAL	**313.22**	**11,485,919.72**	***$36,670.22***

ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

Borrower comments were received on February 3rd, 2025, via electronic correspondence, and are reproduced verbatim below.

Ministère de L'agriculture et de L'élevage

Nous avons reçu l'ICR du PMCR et vous remercions pour votre diligence.
Après lecture du rapport, nous pensons qu'il décrit clairement les difficultés rencontrées et les manquements constatés lors des phases de préparation et de mise en œuvre du projet.
Nous sommes globalement d'accord sur les conclusions et recommandations de l'ICR. Ces recommandations permettront à toutes les parties (Banque mondiale et Gouvernement guinéen) de préparer et d'exécuter efficacement de nouveaux projets.
Nous remercions l'équipe de consultants pour le travail effectué et la franche collaboration.
Bien cordialement

Point Focal: Oumar BARRY (sg.magel@gouvernement.gov.gn)

Translation of Borrower comments:
We have received the ICR of the PMCR and thank you for your diligence.
After reading the report, we believe it clearly describes the difficulties encountered and the shortcomings observed during the preparation and implementation phases of the project.
We generally agree with the conclusions and recommendations of the ICR. These recommendations will allow all parties (World Bank and Guinean Government) to prepare and execute new projects effectively.
We thank the team of consultants for the work done and the open collaboration.
Sincerely

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)

The following letter from the GoG confirming the final list of rural roads to be included in the Project's scope provides detailed reasons for the modifications of this list.

MINISTERE DE
L'AGRICULTURE

N° 093 0 /MA/CAB/2020

REPUBLIQUE DE GUINEE
Travail – Justice – Solidarité

Conakry, le 11 NOV. 2020 20....

Le Ministre

Objet : : Confirmation de la liste finale des pistes à réhabiliter du Projet de Mobilité Rurale et de Connectivité (PMCR)

A

Madame la Chargée de Projet PMCR
Banque Mondiale
-Washington DC-

Madame la Chargée de projet,

Le Projet de Mobilité et de Connectivité Rurales, PMCR né de la volonté de désenclavement des zones de production agricole du Gouvernement Guinéen, avec l'appui de la Banque Mondiale, a pour objectif entre autres, l'amélioration de l'accès des populations rurales aux services sociaux de base et aux marchés par la réhabilitation de 800 km de pistes rurales.

A l'origine, 1100 Km de pistes ont fait l'objet d'études techniques, environnementales et sociales (APD, DAO), issus du Schéma Directeur des pistes rurales élaboré dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du Programme d'Appui au Secteur Agricole de Guinée (PASAG) financé également par la Banque Mondiale. De ce linéaire, 650 km existant dans la zone du projet ont été proposés pendant sa préparation.

Suite à la revue de la liste initiale, il a été retenu que les besoins de désenclavement de la zone PDAIG soient suffisamment couverts et que les linéaires des tronçons soient supérieurs ou égal à 3km. Ainsi une nouvelle liste de pistes de 798,543 km a été établie incluant les préfectures de Siguiri et Mandiana (zone d'aménagement de grandes plaines du PDAIG).

Malheureusement, au cours d'une mission de Georéférencement et de screening environnemental et social des pistes retenues, conduite par l'Unité de Coordination du Projet, il a été constaté que certains tronçons pour un linéaire total de 158,790 km, initialement retenus dans les objectifs du PMCR font l'objet de travaux sur divers financements pour des raisons d'urgences exprimées par les communautés et éviter ainsi la rupture totale du trafic sur lesdits tronçons pendant la période hivernale.

Dans le souci de l'atteinte des objectifs du projet en termes de désenclavement, des pistes de remplacement ont été conjointement identifiées dans la zone du PMCR et du PDAIG pour un linéaire de 159,067, le linéaire total à réhabiliter devenant ainsi 798,807 km, avec à la clé, la garantie de non intervention d'un quelconque programme en dehors du PMCR.

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The map below shows the locations of the rural roads included in the project's scope.




FIGURE 3: OVERVIEW OF DIFFERENT AREAS OF THE RURAL ROADS IN THE PROJECT'S SCOPE (PRIORITY TRACKS (PP) AND BLOCKS A, B AND C)

The map below shows the locations of the 52 km of roads of the Priority Block:




FIGURE 4: MAP OF PRIORITY TRACKS IN PITA, DALABA AND DUBREKA PREFECTURES

The map below indicates the locations of the 313 km of roads of Block A:




FIGURE 5: MAP OF RURAL ROADS OF THE PROJECT IN BOKÉ AND COYAH PREFECTURES

The maps below indicate the locations of the 320 km of roads of Block B:



FIGURE 6: MAP OF RURAL ROADS OF THE PROJECT IN DALABA, PITA, LABÉ AND DUBRÉKA PREFECTURES

The maps below indicate the locations of the 111 km of roads of Block C:




FIGURE 7: MAP OF RURAL ROADS OF THE PROJECT IN SIGUIRI AND MANDIANA PREFECTURES (BLOCK C)

ANNEX 7. PICTURES FROM THE SITES VISIT

The following pictures provide an overview of the Project's achievements in terms of civil works. These photographs were taken during the field visit of October 14-16 in Dubréka prefecture. The mission visited the 13.450 km priority road connecting Kinssi Bourou (RN3) to Bamba in the rural community of Tanènè in the prefecture of Dubréka. The works were provisional accepted in February 2023 and the road already exhibits signs of marked deterioration.



Picture 1: Priority road Kinssi Bourou – Bamba (community of Tanènè)

The hydraulic drainage structures for rainwater are not maintained and are starting to become obstructed, as shown in the below pictures.



Picture 2: Hydraulic drainage structures (community of Tanènè)

The mission also visited some community facilities constructed by the Project: 1 warehouse and 2 boreholes. Unfortunately, these facilities were not yet operational at the time of the visit.



Picture 3: Community facilities (community of Tanènè)